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2Abstract
A test of directional entailment properties of classical quantifiers defined by the theory
of generalised quantifiers (Barwise and Cooper, 1981) is described. Participants had to
solve a task which consisted of four kinds of inference. In the first one, the premise was
of the type Q - hyponym - verb - blank predicate, where Q is a classical quantifier, (e.
g., some cats are [ ] ), and the question was to indicate what, if anything, can be
concluded by filling up the slots in ........- hyperonym - verb - blank predicate (e. g.,
........animals are [ ] ). The second kind of inference was the same, except that the
hyperonym was in the premise and the hyponym in the conclusion. The third and fourth
kinds of inference differed from the first two by the position of the hyperonym (resp.
hyponym) which occupied the place of the predicate (e. g., some [ ] are animals). It was
observed that when the directional entailment holds people respond accorddingly in
most cases and that when the entailment does not hold they correctly fail to produce it.
These results provide elementary, but essential empirical support to this semantic
approach to quantification, as well as a prerequisite for its application to the study of
reasoning with quantifiers. The implications for the psychology of reasoning are
discussed.
3The Psychological Reality of Classical Quantifier Entailment Properties
1. Introduction
Generalised quantification theory (Barwise & Cooper, 1981) posits that a quantifier is a
set of subsets of a domain. This approach has offered a number of important concepts
to semantic theory. One of them is directional entailingness (also called monotonicity).
Informally, this concept captures the intuition that, for example, all dogs entails all
spaniels, or that some spaniels entails some dogs. Formally, a quantifier QD is
downward entailing if, for all domains D: QDY and X ⊆ Y ⊆ D entails QDX. This is
instantiated by the former example. Similarly, a quantifier QD is upward entailing if, for
all domains D: QDX and X ⊆ Y ⊆ D entails QDY (this is instantiated by the latter
example). Directional entailingness can also be defined for binary relations between
subsets (see Westerståhl, 2001). QDXY (with X subject and Y predicate) is left
downward entailing if, for all D: QDXY and X' ⊆ X ⊆ D entails QDX'Y (for instance all
dogs bark entails all spaniels bark); it is right downward entailing if, for all D: QDXY and
Y' ⊆ Y ⊆ D entails QDXY' (no amphibians are dogs entails no amphibians are spaniels).
Analogous definitions obtain for left and right upward entailment, mutatis mutandis.
Viewed in these terms, the four classical quantified sentences have the
folllowing entailing characteristics (using the standard notations A, I, E, and O):
A (all X are Y): left downward, e. g., on an appropriate domain, all antiques are
vases entails all antiques for sale are vases, and right upward, e. g., all antiques are
Ming vases entails all antiques are vases.
I (some X are Y): left upward, e. g., some antiques for sale are Ming vases
entails some antiques are vases, and right upward (like all).
E (no X are y): left downward (like all) and right downward, e. g., no antiques
are vases entails  no antiques are Ming vases.
O (some X are not Y): left upward (like some) and right downward (like no).
Over the last two decades the concept of directional entailingness has played
an important role in semantic theory, e.g. in accounts of the distributional properties of
negative polarity items (Ladusaw, 1980) and the discussion of scalar implicature
computation (these implicatures are suspended in downward environments: Horn,
1989; Chierchia, 2004).
From the viewpoint of generalised quantifiers in semantic theory, an individual
who knows the meaning of a quantifier must have the ability to carry out the directional
4entailments. If people are indeed proficientat this, then this skill might go some way
towards explaining people's reasoning with quantified sentences. Hence, Geurts (2003)
proposed that these entailment properties are highly relevant to reasoning, and in
particular to syllogistic reasoning. But psychologists unfamiliar with this conceptual
framework may be puzzled, if not sceptical, with regard to the psychological reality of
entailment relations that stem from work in philosophical logic and have been endorsed
only on the basis of linguistic intuition. Moreover, the notion that reasoning might be
taken care of by formal properties of the semantic component of language rather than
relying on some logical system (rule-based or model-based) is totally alien to most
psychologists working in the field. A first step towards getting the entailment properties
on the psychologists' agenda would be to ascertain that people do master these. So
far, linguists have not felt it necessary to experimentally investigate the extent to which
people do so, presumably because the existence of entailment properties of quantifiers
is not in dispute. Geurts (2003, Geurts & van der Slick, 2005) did carry out experiments
on quantifier entailment but the aim of these investigations was more elaborate: In the
former case he tested an hypothesis about the relative complexity of various
quantifiers, and in the latter he used fairly complex sentences containing two
quantifiers and limited to right entailment. In brief, there is still a need for an
experimental demonstration that people master the basic entailment arguments
described earlier, which is an elementary assumption to make if generalised
quantification theory provides an adequate framework for the representation of, and
reasoning with, quantifiers. The work that will be reported is but a first step limited to
the quantifiers that have been studied most by psychologists, namely the classical
Aristotelian quantifiers; there is, however, no reason why the method used could not be
applied to other quantifiers, especially to those whose entailment properties are
intuitively less clear.
2. Experiment
2.1. Materials and design
The experiment was administered in written form. Four types of one-premise
arguments were prepared. They will be described by way of an example, where the
relational term are is used, and in which Q stands for one of the four classical
quantifiers.
Type 1. Premise: Q animals are [ ]
Conclusion: ....cats...........[  ]
5This type is defined by the following two characteristics: (i) the "subject" (i. e., the
restriction) is provided, but the predicate (here in square brackets) which is common to
both sentences, is left unspecified; and (ii) the conclusion's subject is a hyponym of the
premise's subject. The two dotted slots were prepared to accommodate the
participant's response, namely a quantifier and a verbal expression (is/ is not/ are/ are
not), respectively. An example of expected correct inference, with the quantifier all,
would be:
Premise: all animals are [ ]
Conclusion: all cats are [ ]
This is a test of left downward entailment.
Type 2. Premise: Q [ ] are animals
Conclusion: ....[ ] ......cats
In this type, (i) the common subject in square brackets is left unspecified, and (ii) the
conclusion's predicate is a hyponym of the premise's predicate. The dotted slots serve
the same purpose as previously. This type tests for right downward entailment.
Type 3. Premise: Q cats are [ ]
Conclusion: ....animals.......[  ]
This is a variant of type 1: It differs only in the hyponymy relation which now is reversed
and serves to test left upward entailment.
Type 4. Premise: Q [ ] are cats
Conclusion: ....[ ] ......animals
Similarly, type 4 differs from type 2 by the reversal of the hyponymy relation and serves
to test for right upward entailment.
The four types appeared with all four quantifiers each, hence 16 different
arguments which will be designated by the traditional letter (A, I, E, or O) and a number
referring to the type. The example given above for type 1 is an A1 argument. Out of the
16 arguments, eight are entailing and the other eight are non-entailing. The present
study focused on people's recognition of quantifiers' entailment properties, so it is the
first eight arguments that specifically which address this question. Their eight non-
entailing counterparts (A3 for A1, E3 for E1, etc.) were also considered because they
provide complementary evidence in the form of a control: If people produce a
conclusion for, e.g., an A1 argument showing that they recognise a left downward
entailment from all animals are [ ] to all cats are [ ], they should not produce a
conclusion for the associated A3 argument from all cats are [ ] to all animals are [ ]
6because this would entail that they execute a left upward entailment at the same time
as they do the left downward entailment.
Unspecified subjects and predicates were used to make the task as context
neutral as possible. This was to avoid that the premises be associated, or restricted, to
specific categories or attributes that could affect participants' inferences for emotional
or cognitive reasons, and so to enable one to generalise the results safely. To make
the task natural, the predicates in argument-types 1 and 3 were not presented as
empty spaces in brackets as above, but were occupied by a pronoun. As the
experiment was administered in French, it was easy to take advantage of the very
natural way that this language refers to an attribute already present in the context by
use of a pronoun (e.g., all cats are [ ] is rendered by quelques chats le sont, where the
neutral pronoun le occupies a place that is empty in English). So, participants were told
that the pronoun referred to some unspecified attribute which they need not be
concerned about. Similarly,  and even more straightforwardly, for the eight argument-
types 2 and 4, it was said in the instructions that the premises referred to some set of
objects (the nature of which, again, participants need not be concerned about). A
premise such as all of them are cats was naturally formulated as all are cats (French
tous sont des chats) without a need for a pronoun (them).
As performance could be influenced by the relational term that was used (are),
the arguments were also formulated with have, so that the previous examples in this
second version became: all cats have [ ], all [ ] have cats, etc. Again there was no
specific predicate to occupy the empty slot as it is very natural in French to use the
pronoun en (e.g., tous les chats en ont, all cats have).
Finally, French has a very common way to express the particular quantifier,
namely il y a. (In English, its closest equivalent there is/there are occurs less frequently
and cannot be used to paraphrase some-sentences as routinely as il y a  for quelques-
sentences in French). This provided an additional condition to generalise the results
beyond the case of one single way to express particular quantification.
Four semantic domains were used: animals, vegetables, flowers, and fruit, with
four different and very common hyponyms in each case (e.g., cat, dog, horse, goat),
hence 16 pairs of hyponyms-hyperonyms; each pair was randomly allocated to one
argument, with the constraint that the four semantic domains appear in each argument
type. A sample of four items is given in the Appendix.
The arguments were presented in booklets prefaced with the instructions. The
eight arguments of type 1 and 3 constituted one block, as did the eight arguments of
7type 2 and 4. Within a block, the arguments were rotated with the constraint that no two
identical quantifiers could be adjacent, and that the types should alternate. One block
was presented first to half of the participants, and the other was presented first to the
other half. In brief, the design was a 2 (verbal form of relation: are vs have) x 2
(formulation of the particular quantifier) x 2 (blocks) x 16 (argument type) factorial
design, with repeated measures on the last two factors.
2.2. Participants and procedure.
The participants were 89 second year psychology students in the University of Paris-8.
All were native speakers of French and untutored in logic. The experiment was
administered during classes.
Participants were instructed to assume that the premises were true; they were
then asked to enter into blank spaces (i) a quantifier that would be guaranteed to make
the conclusion surely true; (ii) the appropriate verbal expression (are /are not /is /is not
or the analog with have, depending on the experimental condition). They were told that
it was not always possible to find a conclusion that was surely true; whenever they
thought this applied, they had to place a cross in the empty spaces of the conclusion.
In all cases, they were asked to indicate how confident they were about their answers
on a four-point scale ranging from zero (not sure at all) to 3 (very sure). A high level of
certainty should accompany the identification or the application of a formal argument,
whereas a lower level of certainty should be observed when the response follows from
the absence of such an identification. Previous research on deduction with quantified
sentences has established the reliability and validity of this measurement (Politzer,
1991).
2.3. Results
There was no effect of order and no effect of the formulation of the quantifier. There
was a significant effect of the are vs. have factor for only one of the 16 argument forms,
to be discussed later. In brief, none of the three binary factors had an effect that was
both systematic and significant, so the results were pooled across these factors. For
any of the arguments, a judgment of entailment was attributed to participants when the
quantifier they entered in the conclusion reproduced that in the premise (and similarly
for the relational term). Non-entailment was operationally defined by any answer
showing the absence of the reproduction of the premise quantifier, in line with the
logical definition of entailingness. Take for example all flowers are [ ] therefore ....roses
are [ ]. Participants were credited with a left downward entailing answer if they filled in
the dotted space with all. They were considered as giving a non-entailing answer in the
8other cases, that is, if (i) they indicated that nothing followed; or (ii) gave a different
quantifier, whether logically incorrect (e. g., no) or correct (e. g., some). Of course in
the latter case, giving a correct conclusion is an indication that the participant masters
at least some of the semantic content of the quantifier in question; in addition, even
though such an answer is preferred to the entailing answer, it is not incompatible with
its recognition. However, because a conservative approach was adopted, these
answers were discounted. In fact, they turned out to be very rare (13 occurrences for
the four arguments where they could occur, that is less than 4 percent of the answers).
Table 1 displays for each of the 16 argument forms the percentages of entailing
answers and (by complementarity) of non-entailing answers. The pattern of results is
very clear.
Table 1.  Percentage of responses and mean certainty ratings associated with the
correct response for the 16 argument forms.
Response A1 E1 E2 O2 I3 O3 A4 I4
entailing° 88.8 86.4 83.1 43.7 92.2 81.8 93.3 71.9
non-entailing 11.2 13.6 16.9 56.3  7.9 18.2  6.7 28.1
mean certainty 2.68 2.63 2.66 2.32 2.40 2.28 2.65 2.50
Response A3 E3 E4 O4 I1 O1 A2 I2
entailing  8.0 11.2 16.9 35.6 33.7 28.1  9.0 47.2
non-entailing° 92.0 88.8 83.1 64.4 66.3 71.9 91.0 52.8
mean certainty 2.32 2.21 1.99 1.87 1.88 1.94 2.14 2.09
Entailing quantifiers are marked with an arrow indicating side and direction
° correct responses
First, for the eight entailing cases, all except O2 were identified as such. The
comparison of the percentages for and against entailment in each case shows the
magnitude of the preferences: The weakest significant majority was 72% (for I4) and
the strongest 93% (for A4). These differences were all significant at the .01 level (chi-
square test). The O2 case did not elicit any significant majority and constitutes an
exception. Pooling the eight arguments together, the mean frequency of entailing
responses was 80% (86% excluding the O2 case). A similar pattern obtained for the
9eight non-entailing arguments1. All except I2 elicited a strong majority against
entailment (weakest: 64% for O4, strongest: 92% for A3) and the associated
differences were all significant (at the .05 level, most being well beyond this level). The
mean frequency of non-entailment responses for these arguments was equal to 76%
(80% excluding I2). In brief, on 14 out of 16 arguments, participants were strongly
sensitive to the presence or to the absence of the entailment property of the four
classical quantifiers, while two arguments, both of type 2, and both particular, seem to
have remained opaque to participants.
3. Discussion
With two exceptions (O2 and I2, which will be considered later), participants' pattern of
inferences conformed to the expected pattern determined by directional entailments, in
strong support of the hypothesis. Interestingly, the analysis of the certainty ratings
shows a pattern in perfect agreement with a well-known phenomenon in the
psychology of reasoning, namely that individuals are better at identifying valid than
invalid arguments. For the entailment answers to entailing arguments, the certainty
ratings ranged from 2.28 (for O3) to 2.68 (for A1) with a mean equal to 2.52, whereas
for the non-entailment answers to non-entailing arguments they ranged from 1.87 (for
O4) to 2.32 (for A3) with a mean equal to 2.06. In brief, all but one of the entailing
inferences were preformed with greater certainty than the non-entailing ones; in
addition, the difference between the means is considerable, as it is almost half a unit
on a scale whose range is equal to three units. To the extent that a high certainty of the
response correlates with the operation of a rule or to the identification of a property, this
result adds support to the notion that in solving the arguments participants
demonstrated that they their recognised the entailment properties of the quantifiers.
The first exception to the overall pattern is the I2 argument; this should not be
viewed as problematic for two reasons. One, although it indicates that participants who
recognised its non-entailing property failed to constitute a significant majority, its
counterpart I4 indicates that the majority correctly recognised the upward entailment.
Now, it is not too surprising that the relatively low performance on the valid argument
I4 (actually the poorest apart from O3) is accompanied with an even poorer
performance on the associated invalid I2 argument for reasons that have just been
mentioned. Two, the present result for the I2-I4 pair might be not entirely robust as it
                                                
1 The expression "non-entailing" is used to qualify one member of a pair of arguments such as
A1/A3; this would be improper if used to qualify the associated quantifier, which is always
entailing.
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was confirmed in only one of two unpublished replication studies run by the author;
interestingly, the failure to replicate concerns a sample of high school students with a
firmer background in mathematics, suggesting (tentatively) a relatively greater difficulty
of this pair, although insufficient to affect participants with higher logical abilities. In
terms of difficulty, it is noteworthy that performance was, by far, worse for particular
than for universal quantifiers, both in terms of certainty ratings and of entailing and non-
entailing correct answers: Universals were the four most often correctly identified as
non-entailing, and they ranked 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th among the most often correctly
identified as entailing. This result may be understandood in set-theoretical terms as
reflecting that universal quantifiers all and no are more simple than their particular
counterparts2: the greater formal complexity results in a greater processing load.
The other exception, the O2 argument, is also a particular argument. It
contradicts the hypothesis more directly as it is entailing; in other words, the right
downward entailment was not recognised for the O sentence. If we notice that the
associated O4 argument showed only a weak majority against upward entailment, it
would seem that a number of individuals were confused with regard to the direction
(upward or downward) of right entailment for this specific quantifier. This conclusion is
reinforced by the results of the two replication studies, both of which yielded
percentages similar to the present experiment. The result for O2 supports Geurts's
claim that negation adds cognitive load to the processing of particular quantifiers
(which has been documented for a long time, see, e. g., Anderson, 1981). That no
similar effect was observed for the other tests of the some...not sentence, namely the
O1 and O3 arguments, which concern left (subject) entailment, is consistent with the
negation hypothesis, as negation in two-place relational quantifiers is linked to the
predicate, not to the subject3. Also, the fact that the certainty ratings for O2 and O4 are
among the lowest of the entailing and the non-entailing arguments, respectively, attests
to the difficulty of this quantifier, while showing the coherence of the results. However,
it could be objected that if the origin of the difficulty of O2 were due to negation, a
similar difficulty for the other right entailing negative quantifier, namely no tested by E2
should have been observed. But this objection is not compelling because considering
the greater ease of processing of universals mentioned above, an interaction between
                                                
2 This can be illustrated with "number triangles" which show that all and no occupy just one
edge of the triangle whereas their counterparts occupy the whole complement of the domain.
3 Left entailment is a property attached to the subject, which makes a partition between
universal and particular sentences (odd arguments), whereas right entailment is a property
attached to the predicate, which makes a partition between affirmative and negative sentences
(even arguments).
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quantity and quality can be expected; that is, it is reasonable to assume that the
additional processing load due to negation has a compounding effect for particulars but
not for universals.
It was mentioned earlier that, out of the 16 arguments, there was only one
significant difference between the are and the have formulations of the sentences.
Interestingly, this concerns the O2 argument, for which the rate of correct responses
was about twice as high with have as it was with are. That failure on the O2 argument
occured with one verb but not with the other, while the same manipulation did not affect
the other arguments, speaks in favour of the idea that this argument has some
peculiarities. One could think of the effect of a scalar implicature. What such an effect
could consist of has to be worked out on a case by case basis for each particular
premise. It is easy to see that, should a scalar implicature be triggered, this could have
no effect for six of the arguments, including O2. For O2, given, for example, some [ ]
are not animals, one can expect that participants who rightly infer some [ ] are not cats
will carry out the same inference in case they add the scalar implicature some [ ] are
animals to the premise, because this implicated premise does not interfere with the
entailment property of the explicit premise. In brief, a scalar implicature cannot justify
the failure to produce the right response for O2. It can be verified that this applies also,
mutatis mutandis, to O3, I3 and I4 (which are entailing) and to O1 and I1 (which are
not). There are, however, two non-entailing cases, I2 and O4, that, in principle, could
be affected by an implicated premise. Consider I2: Participants who correctly fail to
draw the conclusion some [ ] are cats from some [ ] are animals are justified to
conclude some [ ] are not cats if they have added the implicated premise some [ ] are
not animals, because this turns I2 into the downward entailing argument O2. The
same applies to the non-entailing O4 whose implicated premise turns it into the upward
entailing argument I4. Now, a scrutiny of the raw data indicates that such responses
are very rare (6% of the responses to I2 and O4), from which it can be concluded that
implicatures do not affect the performance in the present task; this rules out, in
particular, a possible explanation for the deviant performance on O2.
One cannot underestimate the theoretical importance of the entailments
investigated here, even if they might appear easy enough to carry out. In fact, that
these inferences seem to be so easy is part of the explanandum: the fact that specific
inferences are executed so readily highlights that they are critical for people's
understanding of quantifers as predicted by the theory. Also, the entailingness task was
designed as a precise test and, in view of the number of argument forms tested, a
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severe test of generalised quantification theory. The test can also be considered as
severe from the point of view of the task demands, as the format of response required
that participants produce their own conclusion rather than evaluate a correct conclusion
offered to them, which might have been too transparent. That the theory has stood up
well (and independently of any expectations one might have about hte results of the
test based on intuition) lends strong support to it. Of course, the conclusion that people
recognise most entailment properties of the quantifiers considered here obviously holds
to the extent that participants have been submitted to a valid test, that is, to a task
containing arguments that faithfully operationalise the formal definition of quantifier
entailment. It does not seem quastionable that this has been done in the present
experiment, as (i) the premises presented the quantified sentences of interest; (ii) the
inclusion relations could not fail to be understood as such, as they were chosen from
highly familiar categorisations; and (iii) the conclusions disclosed directly whether or
not  the expected entailed quantified sentences were produced. This suggests that the
task could be exploited to investigate non-classical quantifiers as well.
Finally, the present argument forms may be described as syllogisms in disguise:
Indeed, one can associate a syllogism containing an implicit A minor premise with each
argument form (e. g., EA1 to E1, etc.) Consequently, the claim that the performance on
the task demonstrates people's mastery of the entailment properties of classical
quantifiers justifies another claim, namely that people can solve this kind of syllogism
by whatever means they possess to solve syllogistic tasks in general. This objection
must be considered seriously; but to substantiate it, supporters of the relevant theories
would have to apply them to explain the present data, including data that have not
been reported in the results section.4 This concerns a few striking differences in
performance on several arguments when compared with performance on standard
syllogisms. To take one example, the A3 argument yielded 8% of A conclusions,
whereas the usual rate of A conclusions for the AA3 syllogism is about 65%. More
important, it seems that all theories of syllogism, whether they are psychological or
were developed in classical logic, incorporate some principles that are indistinguishable
from one or another entailment property. This claim cannot be developed in the present
paper, but two examples will suffice: The dictum de omni et nullo, which is at the basis
of the medieval theories of the syllogism, can be shown to be a mere consequence of
                                                
4 Of course, a theory based on the entailing properties of quantifiers faces the same
challenge: some logical principle would have to be added to such a theory to account
for the detailed responses offered by participants.
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entailment properties (Hoeksema, 1986). Similarly, the concept of distribution used in
the formulation of the classic laws of the syllogisms can be reformulated in terms of
downward entailingness (Makinson, 1969).  The upshot of all this is that it is not
unreasonable, based on considerations of parcimony and generality, to view the
quantifier entailment properties as primitive and reasoning principles as derived.
The present investigation concerns itself with classically quantified sentences.
Quantifier entailing properties are highly relevant to the psychology of reasoning. As
Gueurts's (2003) study exemplifies, monotonicity is a plausible main component of a
theory of reasoning with quantified sentences – more specifically of syllogistic
reasoning. Now, the relevance of monotonicity for reasoning can be extended far
beyond quantification, as the various syntactic categories of sentences have
monotonicity properties (van Benthem, 1986; Sanchez-Valencia, 1995). That is, given
two expressions of the same type such that [A] ⊆ [B], inference in natural language can
be viewed as a matter of substituting A with B (or B with A) once the monotonicity of
the syntactic category concerned is determined (which requires a procedure of polarity
marking).  There follows the idea of a general theory of deductive reasoning in natural
language based on monotonicity properties of grammatical components of sentences.
Because monotonicity properties are alien to the current theories of deductive
reasoning, whether these are based on mental models (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1999),
or on mental rules (Rips, 1994; Braine & O'Brien, 1998) or on a more recently
developed probabilistic point of view (Chater & Oaksford, 1999; Oaksford, 2007), for
psychologists supporting any one of them, the grammatical approach may appear as a
revolutionary perspective, certainly worth considering closely.
14
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Appendix
Four test items with an entailing quantifier in each of the four types are given below in
the original French version (with their English translation in the right column).
A1
    tous les    animaux le sont.     all      animals are.
donc: therefore:
                    chien(s).................               dogs(s).................
O3
    quelques    tulipes ne le sont pas.      some      tulips are not.
donc: therefore:
                       fleur(s).................                      flower(s).................
E2
     aucun      n'est un légume.     none      are vegetables.
donc: therefore:
                   ................poireau(x)                   .................leek(s)
I4
  quelques-uns  sont des oranges.      some     are oranges.
donc: therefore:
                         ................... fruits                    ................... fruit
16
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